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Taxation-Promissory Notes Held Not To Be Appropriate Form
of "Payment" to Profit-Sharing Plan
Section 404(a) of the Internal Revenue Code' allows an employer
to deduct on its tax return payments made to a qualified pension or
profit-sharing plan, within limits as to the amount.2 Under section
404(a)(6), this deduction is available if the liability is incurred within
the taxable year and actual payment is made within the deadline for
filing tax returns;' however, uncertainty has arisen as to what satisfies
the "payment" requirement of this section of the Code. Recently the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Don E. Williams Co. v. Commis-
sioner,4 held that delivery of a secured, interest-bearing, demand promis-
sory note within the period prescribed by statute to the trustees of a
qualified employee profit-sharing plan established by a company
did not entitle the company to a deduction for the contribution under
the statute. 5
1. I.R.C. § 404(a) reads as follows:
(a) General Rule.-If contributions are paid by an employer to or
under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or if compensa-
tion is paid or accrued on account of any employee under a plan deferring the
receipt of such compensation, such contributions or compensation shall not be
deductible under section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses) or section
212 (relating to expenses for the production of income); but, if they satisfy
the conditions of either of such sections, they shall be deductible under this
section, subject, however, to . . . limitations as to the amounts deductible in
any year.
2. The limits as to amount are set forth in I.R.C. § 404(a) (1) (pension trusts),
§ 404(a)(2) (employees' annuities) and § 404(a)(3) (stock bonus and profit-sharing
trusts).
3. I.R.C. § 404(a) (6) provides as follows:
(6) Time when contributions deemed made.-For purposes of par-
agraphs (1), (2), and (3), a taxpayer shall be deemed to have made a payment
on the last day of the preceding taxable year if the payment is on account of
such taxable year and is made not later than the time prescribed by law for
filing the return for such taxable year (including extensions thereof).
Before 1974, I.R.C. § 404(a) (6) applied only to accrual basis taxpayers:
(6) Taxpayers on accrual basis.-For purposes of paragraphs (1),
(2), and (3), a taxpayer on the accrual basis shall be deemed to have made
a payment on the last day of the year of accrual if the payment is on account
of such taxable year and is made not later than the time prescribed by law
for filing the return for such taxable year (including extensions thereof).
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 138, 141.
The change in the language of § 404(a) (6) was included in the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.). As a result, cash basis taxpayers
are allowed the same grace period for making payment previously afforded only accrual
basis taxpayers.
4. 527 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1975), af!'d, 45 U.S.L.W. 4160 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
5. Id. at 653. See generally Brandis, The Treatment Accorded Promissory Notes
Under the Federal Income Tax, 52 N.C.L. REv. 93 (1973).
PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
For each of three taxable years6 the Williams Company, an accrual
basis taxpayer, had entered a liability on its books for contributions to
the employee profit-sharing fund established by the company)' In-
stead of making payment in cash before expiration of the statutory
grace period, the company in each of the three years delivered to the
trustees a secured, interest-bearing demand note for the amount of the
liability.8 Collateral for the notes consisted of shares of stock in the
company and interests of two of the shareholders of the plan. The
value of the collateral, it was stipulated, exceeded the face amount of
the notes for each of the three taxable years;1" nevertheless, the
Seventh Circuit, affirming the Tax Court,11 reasoned that the statute
contemplates a form of "payment" more akin to cash than a promissory
note and accordingly upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of the
deduction.
12
A primary source of authority utilized by the Williams court
was a 1932 Supreme Court decision, Eckert v. Burnet,'3 which es-
tablished conclusively that the issuance of a cash basis taxpayer's
promissory note is not the equivalent of payment.14  Thus, the issue
presented to the court was whether, in light of Eckert, accrual basis tax-
payers are to be distinguished from cash basis taxpayers with regard
to promissory notes; the Williams court could find no such distinction.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court cited a 1948 House Ways and
Means Committee Report that stated, "[a]n employer on the accrual
basis of accounting may under existing law deduct contributions actually
paid within the first 60 days of the subsequent year."' 5 The Commit-
tee's use of the phrase "actually paid" intimated a congressional intent
to require a "liquid form of payment and not a promissory note
... ,11 On the basis of this legislative guidance, coupled with the
absence of any language in the statute distinguishing cash and accrual
basis taxpayers, Williams refused to follow the holdings of courts of
6. The taxable years involved were 1967, 1968 and 1969.




11. The Tax Court opinion is reported at 62 T.C. 166 (1974).
12. 527 F.2d at 651.
13. 283 U.S. 140 (1931).
14. Id. at 141.
15. 527 F.2d at 651 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1948)) (emphasis in original).
16. Id.
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appeals of three other circuits and ruled instead that promissory notes
are not an acceptable form of payment.
17
The controversy concerning the use of promissory notes as an
acceptable medium of payment to pension and profit-sharing plans first
arose in 1949 under the statutory predecessor 8 to section 404(a)(6).
In Logan Engineering Co.'" the Tax Court found that the issuance and
delivery of negotiable, interest-bearing notes was not a sufficient mode
of payment.20 Since Logan., three federal courts of appeals have
addressed the issue and all three have overruled the Tax Court's posi-
tion.2 1 The first reversals came in 1953 in the companion cases of
Sachs v. Commissioner and Slaymaker v. Commissioner,2 two cases
with essentially identical fact patterns in which the taxpayers delivered
a "negotiable demand note made payable at a bank to the trustee of
its exempt employees' pension trust. '2 3  The Third Circuit accepted
the promissory note as payment in Slaymaker because of undisputed
evidence of the company's solvency; the court remanded the Sachs case
for a factual determination by the Tax Court of whether that corpora-
tion was solvent.24 In Sachs the court found that on the basis of cases
interpreting another section of the Code2 1 in which promissory notes
were deemed adequate forms of payment, "'payment' or 'paid' does
not invariably mean 'in cash.' "26 The court reasoned that negotiable
notes are, under contemporary commercial law, very similar to checks,
which are undoubtedly an acceptable form of payment.
2 7
Undaunted by these reversals, the Tax Court held firm to its
17. Id. at 653.
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(p)(1), 53 Stat. 15, as amended by Revenue
Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 865 (similar provisions now contained in
I.R.C. § 404(a)).
19. 12 T.C. 860 (1949).
20. Id. at 868.
21. Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1963); Time
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958); Sachs v. Commissioner, 208
F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1953). Additionally, two federal district cburts have reached similar
conclusions: Advance Constr. Co. v. United States, 356 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. 111. 1972);
Steele Wholesale Builders Supply Co. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Tex.
1963).
22. The two cases were combined and the decision for both is reported at 208 F.2d
313 (3d Cir. 1953).
23. Id. at 314.
24. Id. at 316.
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(b) (1) (A), 53 Stat. 16 (similar provisions
now contained in I.R.C. § 267).




position when the issue next arose in 1956 in Time Oil Co.' s Once
again the Tax Court was reversed-this time by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.29 When the issue was presented again in 1962 in Wasatch
Chemical Co.3 ° the Tax Court attempted to distinguish Slaymaker and
Time Oil Co. from the facts in Wasatch on the ground that the notes
given in the two earlier cases were demand notes, whereas the notes
given in Wasatch were five year term notes.3 Consequently, the court
held that the term notes did not possess sufficient similarity to a check
as did the demand notes in Slaymaker.3 2 This distinction did not per-
suade the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals-the Tax Court was again
reversed upon appeal.33 In spite of these reversals, the Tax Court in
Williams reaffirmed the rationale that it first enunciated in Logan.3 4
Finally, in Williams the Tax Court and the Commissioner reaped the
fruits of their perseverence-an affirmance by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 5
Other than the 1948 House Ways and Means Committee Report
cited by Williams,3 6 there is no congressional guidance on the issue
of what constitutes payment for the purposes of section 404(a)(6).
As a result courts have been forced to choose between strict statutory
construction on the one hand, exemplified by the Eckert court's inter-
pretation of "payment, '3 T and a more lenient result brought about
through liberal construction on the other hand, as was done in the Third,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits.3 The Williams court opted for a strict statu-
tory construction of the "payment" requirement, finding no basis in the
statute to distinguish between cash and accrual method taxpayers regard-
ing the use of promissory notes as an acceptable form of payment.3
Eckert v. Burnet had established the notion that, with regard to cash
method taxpayers, 40 promissory notes are not an appropriate mode of
"payment" in the context of a deduction for a bad debt: "[a] de-
deduction may be permissible in the taxable year in which the peti-
28. 26 T.C. 1061 (1956).
29. Time Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958).
30. 37 T.C. 817 (1962).
31. Id. at 819-20.
32. Id.
33. Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843, 847 (10th Cir. 1963).
34. 62 T.C. at 168.
35. See text accompanying notes 4, 5, 10-12 supra.
36. 527 F.2d at 651 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1948)).
37. Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 140, 141-42 (1931).
38. See text accompanying notes 21-35 supra.
39. 527 F.2d at 650-51.
40. 283 U.S. 140 (1931), discussed in text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
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tioner pays cash."41  Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit in
Williams, if accrual method taxpayers are to be treated like cash
method taxpayers, and if promissory notes are not a proper form of pay-
ment for cash method taxpayers, it logically follows that the use of
promissory notes is also forbidden for accrual method taxpayers.42
The notion of similarity of treatment between cash and accrual
method taxpayers under section 404(a)(6), as presented by the Williams
court, is bolstered by the fact that in other sections of the Code in which
a distinction between the two types of taxpayers is intended the lan-
guage "paid or accrued" or "paid or incurred" is normally employed.
43
By contrast, in section 404(a)(6) this language is missing; the statute
merely uses the term "paid." The Williams court's distinction based
on contrasting terminology is by no means perfect, however. In at least
one other section of the Code in which the term "paid" is used, 4 the
courts have allowed promissory notes to satisfy the payment require-
ment.45 The Tax Court has attempted to distinguish between the two
situations in that the sections allowing promissory notes as "payment"
merely limit a deduction already granted, whereas section 404(a)(6)
is an affirmative grant of a deduction and as such is to be more strictly
construed 46 -further indication that something more resembling cash
than a promissory note must be offered as payment.47
Unfortunately the court's reliance on this definition of "paid" or
"payment" does not withstand close examination; even the Tax Court
has admitted that the definition of payment that requires liquidation of
a liability in cash does not foreclose the use of checks as an acceptable
method of payment.48 No one would seriously argue that a check is
anything other than a substitute form of cash, and contemporary com-
mercial law reflects this assumption. The inconsistency of the Tax
Court's position, which rejects promissory notes as payment while
accepting other forms of noncash substitutes as payment, is illustrated
41. 283 U.S. at 141-42 (emphasis added).
42. See 527 F.2d at 651.
43. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 164(a), 174(a)(1), 175(a), 212, 216(a).
44. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(c) (1), 53 Stat. 17 (now I.R.C. § 267).
45. See, e.g., Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.
1947) (promissory note given by a corporation to one of its officers as salary constituted
payment of the salary).
46. The Tax Court first enunciated this position in Logan Eng'r Co., 12 T.C. 860,
868-69 (1949).
47. See 527 F.2d at 651.
48. E.g., in Wasatch Chem. Co., 37 T.C. 817 (1962), the Tax Court stated that
"[tihe act of payment for tax purposes, and generally, may be accomplished by the
transfer of funds directly or by check." Id. at 819.
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further in a decision rendered by the Tax Court in 1958, 49 nine years
after its first promissory note decision5" under section 404(a)(6)'s
predecessor. In Colorado Nationdl Bank5 the taxpayer transferred a
piece of real property to a qualified pension plan in order to satisfy its
obligation for the taxable year in question.52 The Commissioner relied
on the Tax Court's earlier decisions involving promissory notes to argue
that the transfer of land was not a payment in cash or its equivalent
as arguably required by the statute, and accordingly disallowed the
deduction.53 Rejecting the Commissioner's argument, the Tax Court
found that the taxpayer transferred an income-producing asset with an
ascertainable value to the pension trust and that this payment was
"within the words and intent of the applicable statutory provisions."5 4
The Seventh Circuit made no mention of Colorado National Bank in
the Williams decision.
Colorado National Bank points out in the context of a transfer
of land what the three circuit courts55 that had ruled on the promis-
sory note issue prior to Williams had emphasized: in certain situations,
promissory notes, like a piece of land or cash or a check, do indeed
have a "value" that can be ascertained. 56 Moreover, promissory notes
also have income-producing capabilities; in two of these cases the notes
paid interest until they were satisfied.5" Indeed in situations involving
negotiable demand notes, there is probably a closer "cash equivalency"
than with a parcel of land.
As suggested in Colorado National Bank and by the Third, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, the most logical approach to the problem is not to
emphasize the form of payment, but rather to inquire whether anything
of value has been transferred; such a determination presents no insur-
mountable problems. In Slaymaker, for example, the circuit court
found that the notes were worth their face amount.55 This finding was
based on the fact that the corporation was solvent and the notes were
adequately secured.59 Additionally, the same court remanded the
49. Colorado Nat'1 Bank v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 933 (1958).
50. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
51. 30 T.C. 933 (1958).
52. Id. at 934.
53. Id. at 934-35.
54. Id. at 936.
55. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
56. 30 T.C. at 935-36.
57. Wasatch Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 843, 844 (10th Cir. 1963);
Sachs v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 313, 314 (3d Cir. 1953).
58. 208 F.2d at 314.
59. Id.
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Sachs case because no finding was made below on the "value" ques-
tion.60 The Slaymaker-Sachs court was not willing to allow promissory
notes per se to satisfy the "value" requirement; instead there was an
inquiry into the underlying worth of the notes.
This "value" approach, first taken by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Sachs and Slaymaker, followed by the Ninth and Tenth Cir-
cuits, and subsequently rejected in Williams is an eminently workable
and sensible approach. As was suggested by the circuit court in Sachs,
findings of fact could easily be made to determine if the notes had any
value. This approach allows the best of both worlds. When a solvent
corporation is temporarily caught in a cash-flow squeeze, contributions
could still be made in the form of notes; the pension plans would not
have to be slighted in that year and the corporation could take a deduc-
tion for its contribution. On the other hand, when the notes are of no
value or worth less than their face value, the deduction would properly
be disallowed or reduced. Certainly such an approach does not require
an overly strained interpretation of the statute, and the legislative his-
tory on this issue is so scanty as to be meaningless.
Aside from the strict statutory construction applied by the Williams
court, an obvious underlying concern throughout these cases is the pro-
tection of the pension and profit-sharing plans from employer contribu-
tions of worthless promissory notes. Yet the fact remains that under
the law, trustees of pension and profit-sharing plans are perfectly free
to invest in the stocks and securities of the employer corporation."'
Apparently, such investments are a common practice in many of the
large pension plans. 62 Hence, the value of the plan in such situations
depends ultimately upon the solvency of the corporation. If the cor-
poration's promissory notes are of little or no value, then surely its
securities are not very valuable, and the plan remains in jeopardy.
Allowing trustees to hold securities but not promissory notes makes
60. Id. at 316.
61. Rules concerning investments in employer securities by pension and profit-
sharing trusts were tightened considerably with the passage of ERISA, cited note 3 supra.
Nevertheless, pension and profit-sharing plans may still invest in employer securities,
within the percentage limitations set forth in § 407(a) (2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1107
(a) (2) (Supp. V 1975), if the security is an "employer security" as defined in ERISA
§ 407(a) (1) (D) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1) (D) (5) (Supp. V 1975). See Sollee &
Shapiro, (ERISA) Profit-sharing Plans-Qualification, 310 TAX MANAGEMENT A-40
(1975); Sollee & Shapiro, (ERISA) Pension Plans-Qualification, 309 TAx MANAGE-
MENT A-44 (1975).
62. See D. McLAUGHL N, TiE EXECUTIVE MONEY MAP 11 (1975).
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little sense if the ultimate goal is to protect these plans and ensure their
survival.
The issue in the Williams case is a close one and perhaps should
receive specific congressional attention; in the absence of more illumi-
nating congressional guidance, however, encouragement of pension and
profit-sharing plans and the preservation of their integrity demand a
judicial definition of "payment" that includes promissory notes within
its ambit-a broader definition than that adhered to for almost thirty
years by the Tax Court and, more recently, by the Seventh Circuit.
Admittedly this result would have to be achieved at the expense of a
strict statutory construction; however, this broader definition of "pay-
ment" would be tempered by an inquiry into the underlying worth of
the notes as suggested by the Slaymaker-Sachs approach. This result
would encourage more corporations to adopt or retain pension plans,
which is, after all, the basic purpose of section 404(a).
ALLEN T. WOOD III
Zoning -Adjudication by Labels: Referendum Rezoning and
Due Process
In recent years, the use of procedural devices providing for direct
citizen participation' in land use planning decisions has proliferated.2
The use of these devices to regulate change in land use patterns pre-
viously established by zoning ordinances 3 has given rise to due process
1. Popular participation is facilitated by the availability of two devices: the ini-
tiative and the referendum. The initiative permits citizens to legislate directly by having
a proposed measure placed on the ballot and submitted to a popular vote. The referen-
dum permits citizens to have measures already approved by a legislative body submitted
to voter review. The operation of these devices is usually conditioned on the receipt
of appropriate petitions requesting the particular initiative or referendum. Comment,
The Initiative and Referendum's Use in Zoning, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 74 nn.1 & 2
(1976).
2. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 439 P.2d 290
(1968); San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d
570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 3184 (1976); Associated
Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 41 Cal. App. 3d 677, 116 Cal. Rptr. 326 (Ct. App.
1974); West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Bird v. Soren-
son, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
3. Land use restrictions imposed by a local zoning ordinance can be altered by
the use of three procedures. When the application of zoning restrictions to a particular
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